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THE JUDGE
jamm C. Thomas*
Much has been written on the subject-The Judge. Even with all
the time and effort represented by the voluminous-available material,
do we really understand this creature? Instead of understanding, we have
misunderstanding, for the explanation or description varies depending on
the views of the writer. We find an array of articles and books on the
subject, ranging from a general to a specific discussion. And in between,
we find biographies which might be classed as both general and specific.
With this article, I add to this reservoir of materiaL But I hasten to
say that I do not profess to be furnishing the needed understanding of
the Judge. With both time and space budgeted (which is always the case
in law review writing), it is impossible to do the subject justice.
Especially is this true when a general approach is followed. What I do
seek, through this article, is to spark, in the reader's mind, a deeper
interest in the subject. By generating this interest, perhaps we will
come to understand better the man called The Judge.
Before the subject can be comprehended, we must dispel certain
aberrant thoughts and ideas. Included among these aberrations is the
idea that named persons such as Marshall, Holmes, Shaw and others have
individually reformed or made law. After identifying the judge, we
must then examine his functions, powers, influence, and qualifications.
In this paper, I discuss and attempt to show the relationship of these
various factors. Finally, I discuss what can be considered the most serious
aberration, that is, our idea of the responsibilities of the judge. There is
a tendency to add to these responsibilities by requiring that the individual,
holding the office of judge, set a good example in his daily life. Re-
sponsibilities imposed on a judge must be on the office and not the
individual; otherwise we jeopardize judicial independence.
My primary purpose, being to generate new and original thought
on the subject, is not lost even should the reader think some of my
positions wrong. Being wrong is not disastrous as long as the writer is
dearly wrong.
I. WHO IS THE JUDGE?
A cursory examination of the "Index to Legal Periodicals" and
bibliographies on the subject will quickly impress upon one's mind
the idea that many writers attempt to answer the question-Who is
*Mr. Thomas received his B.S. in 1952, and his LL.B. in 1957, from the
University of Alabama. In 1964 he received his LLM. from the New York
University School of Law. He is a member of the Alabama Bar Associaiton, and
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the Judge? -by focusing their discussion on a named Judge. Such an
approach could well be rejected as being an inadequate answer. In fact,
identification through works of outstanding individual jurists might be
harmful to later judges. Such was suggested by Jerome Frank after his
delivery of an eulogy to Judge Learned Hand. He stated:
A great man, such as Learned Hand, we should prize. Yet - as I'm
sure he would tell you-you should beware lest you do him an
ill-service by so venerating him that he will stand in the way of
those who come after him, paralyzing them through awe of his
achievements.'
The judge is a man of many faces; a man with no personal identity.
He is the man who selects words of judicial opinions. He is the man
who injects a moral fiber into decisions as his part in the moralization
of American life.' He is the man who makes the law.3 He is the man
who finds the law which lay dormant in the sea of custom and the com-
mon law! He is the man who acts the part of an umpire in the game
called advocacy.' He is an instrument through which the legislative or
Congressional policy is carried out.6 He is a man who has been given
an opportunity to perform a noble task and to contribute service to his
country And finally he is a mortal; a human being - subject to all the
errors of the imperfect soul.
With this divergent view of the Judge, why must we persist in
making personal identifications? Chief Justice John Marshall has been
called-"the expounder of our Constitution." He (personal identity)
was said to favor a strong central government in order to develop a
strong national economy and to obtain and preserve the respect of the
world. "All of these desired results he achieved through decision after
I KRIsTEIN, A MAN's REACH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUDGE J1ROME FRANK
70 (1965).- 1 don't suggest that we cease writing about individual judges; such
writings provide a reservoir of interesting and valuable reading.
21 don't intend to get into the controversy concerning the moral decision,
but assuming that there is an element of morality in judicial decisions, one is not
finished. He must then inquire of the source of this morality- the judge's
standard or the community's standard. For a review see: Shapiro, Morals and the
Courts: The Reluctant Crusaders, 45 MINN. L. REv. 897 (1961).3The role of the judge has been so described by some writers. See BRUCE,
THE AMERICAN JUDGE (1924); GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE
LAw (1909); FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND (6th ed. 1949).4 B1. Comm. *69 (Cooley's ed. 1884) -"(Judges) are the depositaries of
the laws ...."
s51n our adversary system the theory is that "truth" can best be determined as
a result of two equal offensive forces. Jerome Frank, on the other hand, compares
this system with the old physical fight. Under his "fight theory," it was argued
that the adversary system did not insure that all pertinent facts would be made
available to the tribunal. See FRANK, COURiTS ON TRIAL, 80-85 (2nd ed. 1950).
As for the judge acting as an umpire, Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said: "(J)udges
are not referees at prize fights but functionaries of justice." Johnson v. U.S., 333
U.S. 46, 54 (1948).
6This is identified as a separate role because I believe it has a special signifi-
cance in the, public law field. See: Cox, Reflection Upon Labor Arbitration, 72
HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1486 (1959). But then see: Sullivan, FPC Jurisdiction Over
Commingled Gas, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 638, 642 (1962).
7 See remarks of Mr. Chief Justice Warren -JONES, CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN
MARSHALL, IX (1956).
W'ol. 2, No. 2
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decision until they became imbedded in our law."' Why? Why did
Chief Justice Warren write as if these things were personal achievements
of John Marshall, the individual? He, the individual, accomplished
nothing through the judicial decision he wrote. It was The Judge- the
faceless human being -that deserves credit for these attainments. For
sure, Chief Justice Marshall does deserve praise, but this laudation should
be based on his carrying out the functions and obligations attached to
his office.9 It might well be said that Marshall was a product of the
times. There are, today, an untold number of judges who look upon their
office with the same responsibility and dedication that Marshall looked
upon his. The difference is only time -from a formative period to a
more stable period.
Other judges have been eulogized for, what writers inaccurately
term, their personal accomplishments. For example, Professor Levy writes:
"More than any other judicial figure, Massachusetts' Lemuel Shaw de-
serves credit for formulating the fundamentals of American railroad
law.""0 Then we see Professor Reid referring to Judge Henry Brannon
and Judge Marmaduke Dent as the shapers of West Virginia law."
Professor Reid also writes of Justice Charles Cogswell Doe of the New
Hampshire Supreme Judicial Court. "Justice Doe," said Professor Reid,
"is remembered as one of the great reformers of American law."12 Each
of these judges deserves the tribute given to them, but not for being
reformers or shapers of the law. A more deserving and more accurate
acclamation would be that they each efficiently and courageously per-
formed their functions as a judge. Reforms, if there are any, are
accomplished by the judicial office - given life by the judge; they are not
accomplished by the named judge as an individual As individuals, these
named persons possess no power. The power is derived from the judicial
office and exercised by the individual when and only when he is clothed
with his judicial attire of authority. And once he adorns himself with
this judicial attire, he loses his identity as an individual. He is converted
into The Judge.
Another example of how writers focus on the named individual
can be seen in writings about Judge Isaac Parker.1 3 It has been said that
3 JONES, op. cit. supra note 7 at XV, remarks of Mr. Chief Justice Warren.
9 See JoNEs, op. cit. supra at 78 where Professor Fairman noted that the
Supreme Court justices, prior to Marshall, badly needed direction, purpose, method
and a sense of vocation. 'When Marshall came to the Court it was a time-high
time- for greatness."
10Levy, Chief Justice Shaw, and the Formative Period of American Railroad
Law, 51 COLLTK L. REv. 327 (1951). See also: Levy, Shaw-America's Greatest
Magistrate, 7 VILL. L. REv. 389 (1962).
"Reid, Henry Brannon and Marmaduke Dent: The Shapers of W. Va. Law,
65 W. VA. L REv. 19, 99 (1963).
"Reid, The Reformer and the Precision: A Study in Judicial Attitudes, 12
Jo. L. ED. 157 (1959) -In this article, Prof. Reid compares the attitudes of
two judicial colleagues - Charles Doe and Alonzo Carpenter. Explaining the basic
differences between these jurists, we see the statement: "Judge Carpenter undertook
to do no more than to interpret the law; Judge Doe, if he thought the occasion
justified it, did not scruple to alter it, abrogate it, or add to it." p. 157.
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Judge Parker sentenced 160 persons to be hanged, of which 79 were
actually hanged." From this he gained the reputation- the hanging
judge. Those individuals who were convicted of murder generally heard
these words:
"I sentence you, , to be hanged by the neck
until dead. And may God, whose laws you have broken ... have
mercy on your souls.""5
Reading this pronouncement, one must inquire as to the referent
of the word "I". Which is more accurate: "I, Isaac Parker," or "I, the
judge?" Surely no one would say that Parker, the individual, sentenced
anyone to be hanged. This would be a great disservice to the man. Then, if
we don't charge the judge, as an individual, for the hangings, why
should we pay tribute to a judge, as an individual, for reforms accom-
plished through the powers of the judicial office? We must learn to
praise or criticize the proper act. And this act always remains the same.
Is the individual properly exercising the powers and recognizing the
obligations of the judicial office? One would never say that a corpora-
tion's president made a certain profit for the company. Instead, one
would say that the corporation, under the leadership of the president,
made a certain profit. It's the same thing with a judge.
Speaking again of Judge Parker, he would never have said that he,
the individual, ordered the hangings. He recognized that his power
was only that derived from the instrument of a court of law. Without
any personal identification of the Judge, Parker said:
The Court is but the humble instrument to aid in the execution
of that divine justice which has ever decided that he who takes
what he cannot return - human life - shall lose his own.
16
To Parker, the obligation of sentencing belonged to the court. Likewise,
any deserving tribute or praise belonged to the court. "We are proud of
the record of the court at Ft. Smith," said Parker, simply, "we believe we
have checked the flood of crime." 17
Disposing of the question of personal identity, we again ask: Who
is the judge? "A judge," answers Piero Calamandrei, "is a lawyer mellowed
and purified by age, a man from whom the years have taken the illusions,
exaggerations, prejudices, and perhaps even the impulsive generosity of
youth. The judge is what remains after there have been removed from
the lawyer all those exterior virtues which the crowd admires."'" Even
this well phrased statement does not adequately answer the question.
Conclude then that there is no precise identification to be found. In
order for one to intelligently understand the judge, he must examine
many factors including- the functions and powers of the judge; the
influence of the judge; the characteristics and qualifications of the
1IHApRINGTON, op. cit. supra, note 13 at 58.
'sHrARiNGToN, op. cit. supra, note 13 at 30- the reason why the word
"souls" is plural is because, on occasions, there were multiple sentencings. It was
reported that on Sept 3, 1875, six men were hanged together. p. 30.
16HA MUNGroN, op. cit. supra, note 13 at 38.
17HArINGroN, op. cit. supra, note 13 at 59.
18CALAMANDRE!, EULOGY OF JuDas, 17 (2nd. ed. 1956, tr. by Adams and
Phillips) -This book, which is only 88 pages long, deserves to be read by every-
one interested in the law.
[Vol 2, No. 2
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judge; and the responsibilities and obligations of the judge.
II. WHAT ARE THE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE JUDGE?
As I thought about this section, it became apparent that it would
be most difficult, if not impossible, to separate the functions of a judge
from the powers of a judge. Powers of a judge can only be activated
when the judicial functions are performed. Actually, this says nothing
more than what was previously emphasized. The powers of a judge are
derived from his office." When the judge walks out of his official
station -the court -he walks out stripped of his judicial power. He
again becomes an individual. True, that while in this individual capacity,
he may carry wtth his a certain degree of prestige and influence, yet he
carries no power.
Since these factors cannot be separated, we obviously must examine
the functions of the judge. Through such an examination we shall come
to appreciate the scope and limits of his power. With this design, should
a discussion of the functions of the trial judge be disjoined from those
of the appellate judge? Are their functions so far apart? Where necessary,
a separation will be made; however, I suggest that they each are reaching
for a common goal.
As a common goal, both the trial judge and the appellate judge
seek to serve the cause of justice. But what is justice?20 The answer to
this question must come from the way it is used.' And in this article,
the term "justice" is used to indicate an equal application of the law. We
can then say that a common function of the trial judge and the appellate
judge is to insure parties an equal application of the law. This is not to
say that such equality is accomplished in all cases;' it is only to identify
There are differences, however, between functions of the trial judge19 U. S. CONST. ART. III, sec. 1- "The judicial power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court . . ." Under this provision, it is dear that
power is vested in the Court and not the judge as an individual. The Judge merely
symbolizes the judiciary. He acts as a conduit through which the powers of the
Court are channeled.
" This question opens up a vast sea of exploration. As stated by Hans Kelsen:
"No other question has been discussed so passionately; no other question has caused
so much precious blood and so many bitter tears to be shed; no other question has
been the object of so much extensive thinking by the most illustrious thinkers
from Plato to Kant; and yet, this question is today as unanswered as it ever was."
KELSEN, WHAT is JusTicE 1 (1957).21 KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 20 at 24.
22See LASKI, THE STATE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1935) as cited in
AUERBAcH, GARRIsoN, HuRsT & MmumN, THE LEGAL PRocEss 73 (1961) -
"Nor must we forget the fact that wealth is a decisive factor in the power to take
advantage of the opportunities the law affords its citizens to protect their rights."
This statement brings to mind the remark we have all heard -"Capital punish-
ment is reserved to the poor." But see: BRUcE, THE AMERICAN JUDGE, 28 (1924).
Professor Bruce offers an example where an equal application of the law by a
judge results in inequality. For this, he blames the legislature. A rich man and a
poor man are fined the same amount for a traffic violation. This equal application
was described by Judge Parker as follows: "None are so high in station as to be
above it (law), and none so low as to be beyond it .. .As does the light of
Heaven, it blesses rich and poor alike, and if enforced without fear, favor or
affection ... every man can feel that there is none to molest him, or make him
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a function. A failure here should not bring criticism to'the jtdge, the
faceless - unidentifiable person described above. It should be directed
to the individual for failing to carry out the functions of his office.
.and functions of the appellate judge. Trial judges are not dealing with
facts sterilized by reduction to affidavit and memorandum form. They
iear and observe a re-enactment of chunks of life from the lips of
.witnesses. On the other hand, the appellate judge works in the calm of
a library- free from the strife and emotions of the trial n His hearing
the live testimony of witnesses; his feeling the emotions of the parties;
and his observations are all sources of power held by a trial judge.
Because of his closeness to the trial, the trial judge's finding of facts is
rarely challenged by appellate courts. If we conclude that this is power,
we then must inquire- what kind of power? How much power? This
power can be the power of life or death; the difference between wealth
or bankruptcy; or a change from scorn and ridicule to a position of
equality.
Fact finding, and that is what we are speaking of, is a tremendous
source of power? But only through an examination of the importance
of facts can this scope of power be appreciated. First of all, the rights
and obligations of the party litigants will be determined, not necessarily
by the true facts of the case but rather by the facts as seen by the trial
judge.26 Facts can send an innocent man to his death. Facts can release
a guilty man from jail. Facts can impose an enormous money judgment
on one guilty of no wrong. And facts can cause scorn by erroneously
showing truth in a libel action. This then illustrates the magnitude of the
fact-finding power- held by the trial judgeY
To a certain extent the trial court's power is limited through the
review procedure. But this review procedure, a function of the appellate
court, is also a source of power. Assuming (for purposes of this paper
only) that none of the findings of fact are challenged by the appellate
court, we then ask: What is the review power? An answer to this ques-
tion can come only through an examination of the functions. So what are
the functions? One of the primary appellate functions is to see if the trial
court decision is in accordance with the law. In making this determina-
tion, the judge will construe a statute if one is involved and he will ex-
amine the decision in light of legal precedent or stare decisis. It is through
23BoTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 129 (1952); FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 152 (2nd
ed. 1950).24 FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 48 (2nd ed. 1950).
2 judge Jerome Frank says that facts as found by a trial court or a jury are
subjective. They are subjective because a witnesses statement becomes a pertinent
fact only if believed.
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 22, 150 (2nd ed. 1950).2 6 FRANK, op. cit. supra note 24 at 167.-1 might add that the responsibility
of developing facts to best insure "truth" rests with lawyers and not the judge.
27I have purposely omitted any discussion of the fact-finding role of the jury.
For a critical comment about the jury see: FRANK, op. cit. supra note 24 at 110,
120, 132. Frank offers an alternative to the abolishment of juries -the special
verdict- see p. 141. Also see: Goodharr, The Judge, the Jury and the Lawyer
12 (1964) John F. Murry Endowment Lecture, College of Law, The University
of Iowa).
[Vol 2, No. 2
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this doctrine that we truly see the appellate powers in operation.
There is nothing mystifying about the powers of the appellate
judge under the doctrine of stare decisis. It is a power of manipulation,2
but a rational or logical manipulation. In order to be rational or logical,
'the manipulation must occur within the framework of legal precedent.
This is necessary if we are to remain consistent with the definition of
"justice" - equal application of the law. One will no doubt ask: How
can you have manipulation and at the same time have any equal applica-
tion? The solution is simple but it is only simple if one understands the
doctrine of stare decisis.
Reference to stare decisis stands for the theory that courts will stand
by decisions and not disturb settled matters. Under this doctrine a legal
rule handed down in one case will be applied in all future cases that are
similar in nature or that have the same factual pattern.29 But one must
explore further. What is a legal rule under this doctrine? What facts
must be examined to determine if two cases are similar? Before attempt-
ing to answer these questions, certain observations should be made. First,
as will be seen in the discussion, these two questions somewhat overlap.
Second, and more important, we are not speaking of a mechanical opera-
tion. There is much more to the doctrine of stare decisis than finding a
legal rule and mechanically applying it to a factual problem."s
When we say that a legal rule of one case will be applied to all future
cases with the same or similar factual patterns, we mean that the holding
of a case that carries with it the weight of precedent will be so applied.
It is this holding, having the weight of precedent, that is our legal rule
under the doctrine of stare decisis. Thus, the next logical question is:
When does a holding have the weight of precedent? For a holding to
have the weight of precedent it must be the decision of a court in the
same jurisdiction. Under this theory then a decision handed down by the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma would be binding only on the lower courts
of Oklahoma. In other jurisdictions such a decision, at the most, would
only be persuasive."a
28 I urge the reader not to take this word "manipulation" to mean that law
is arbitrary. Nor would I prescribe to any idea that a judicial decision has no
rational basis. But according to Judge Hutcheson a trial judge decides a case on
the basis of a feeling or hunch. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function
of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, 14 CoRN. L. Q. 274 '(1929). For a dis-
cussion of this point see: FRANK, op. cit. supra note 24 at 170.
2 From this, one again sees the importance of facts.20 A criticism of the school of analytical jurisprudence is that it seeks to
mechanically apply legal rules. Courts, suggests Prof. Hart, are guilty of formalism
or literalism when they make an excessive use of analytical methods. Such formalism
or mechanicalism casts the law into a sea of uncertainty. And as Professor Hart
states: "Decisions made in a fashion as blind as this . . . scarcely deserve the name
of decisions; we might as well toss a penny in applying a rule of law." Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 610-611
(1958).
31 This sheds light on the power of a judge. We might say that the power of
a judge in Oklahoma is limited by territorial boundaries. To avoid a discussion of
cases where a judicial decision in one state can affect the rights and obligations
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Actually, this discussion falls short of a complete explanation of
stare decisis and how it relates to the power of the judge. I explained only
the circumstances under which a judicial decision would carry the weight
of precedent. The more important question is: How do we determine the
holding of a case? When this question is answered, one will see how the
appellate judge's manipulation power works.
How do you determine the rule of a case? Many legal scholars have
attempted to come up with the answer;' however, in my opinion, Profes-
sor Goodhart offers the most workable solution.' According to Professor
Goodhart, the first step in determining the ratio decidendi or holding of
a case is to determine if the opinion was rendered by the judge and then
to determine if the opinion was necessary for the decision of a particular
case. Now stated in the most simple terms, this ratio decidendi of the
case is determined by taking the material facts of the case and then ap-
plying the naked decision to these facts. If we stop here, the solution is
too simple. We must inquire of the material facts. How do we determine
what facts are material? A lawyer's value judgment as to what facts are
material is of no concern. It is the judge who decides the case. And
"(t)he judge... reaches a conclusion upon the facts as he sees them."-4
Our task in analyzing a case is to state those material facts upon which
the judge's conclusion is based. An aid for determining these material
facts was discussed by Professor Goodhart. Briefly summarized, he su-
gests that if a judge specifically states or impliedly treats a fact as ma-
terial or immaterial then we must accept them as such.m And, declares
Professor Goodhart, all facts of person, time, place, kind and amount are
immaterial unless stated to be material.
Through the use of the theory offered by Professor Goodhart, the
judge can follow prior decisions, distinguish prior decisions, or reject
prior decisions. When the judge applies or distinguishes prior decisions,
he is manipulating. Perhaps an example would clarify this. In our ex-
ample the plaintiff files suit against the defendant in an attempt to
recover damages for injuries received as a result of negligence on the
part of defendant's agent. The facts showed that the plaintiff was also an
employee of defendant. On the day of the accident, the plaintiff and the
negligent servant had loaded a wagon and were making deliveries. The
employee drove the wagon negligently, injurying his co-worker, the
plaintiff.3 As lawyer for the plaintiff, we find that there are no cases
3 For a good survey of the writings on this question see: AUERBACH, op. cit.
supra note 22 at 43-65.
3 Professor Goodhart's theory on how to determine the rule, holding on
ratio decidendi of a case can be found in: GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND THE COMMON LAW, 1-26 (1931), and VANDERBILT, STUDYING LAW,493-525 (1945).
34VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra, note 33 at 505. (Emphasis belongs to the
author).
3SVANDERBILT, op. cit. supra, at 523-525. On these pages, Professor Goodhart
enumerates the rules of analysis. He makes one thing clear and that is- the rule
of a case is not found in the reasons given in the opinion and it is not the rule
of law set forth in the opinion. Judge Frank's theory of fact finding (note 25
supra) becomes quite pertinent.
"This factual pattern was taken from the case, Priestley v. Fowler, 3 Mees &
Wels. 1 (Exchequer 1837), as reported in AUERBACH, op. cit. supra, note 22 at 15.
[Vol 2, No. 2
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directly on point, but we do find many cases dealing with the liability of
a principal for the acts of his agent. One of these principal-agent cases
might be reduced to Professor Goodhart's theory as follows:37
Facts.
1. Plaintiff was injured by employee of defendant.
2. Employee was acting within the line and scope of his au-
thority.
3. Employee was negligent.
Conclusion.
Defendant is liable to plaintiff.
By analyzing one of the early agency cases in this fashion, we come up
with the rule that: A principal is liable for the negligence of his agent
who is acting within the line and scope of his authority. As you can see,
all that has been done in formulating this legal rule is to restate the
material facts and the conclusion. Everything else in the opinion is either
reasoning or dicta and carries no weight of precedent. At the most, this
reasoning and dicta is persuasive and not binding.
Going back to our example, we will attempt to show that the
agency case is binding precedent. The example case could be summarized
to show its similarity with the agency case.
Facts.
1. Plaintiff was injured by employee of defendant
2. Employee was acting within the line and scope of his au-
thority.
3. Employee was negligent.
If we stop here, it is obvious that the material facts in the example are
identical with the facts in the agency case. Thus, under stare decisis, the
plaintiff must recover; however, the judge, using his manipulation power,
adds another material fact:
4. Plaintiff was also an employee of defendant.
Conclusion.
Defendant is not liable to plaintiff.
By adding one fact, the judge has developed a new rule. While so doing,
he has remained consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis. Instead of
the well established principal-agent rule, we see the development of the
fellow-servant rule. An employer is not liable to an employee injured
through the negligence of a fellow-employee. Again, you can see how the
rule is established by restating the conclusion of the case and the material
facts. Now, under the doctrine of stare decisis, we must apply this rule,
in all future cases with the same factual pattern. But through the power
of the judge, these rules can be expanded, contracted, or ignored merely
by manipulating the facts. The more material facts found, the narrower
the rule. The fewer material facts, the broader the rule. For instance: If
a later judge examined the example case above, he might say that the
wagon was a material fact. By so doing our fellow-servant rule would
have been: An employer is not liable to an employee injured through
3 For similar examples see Professor Goodhart's theory -VANDERBILT, op.
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the negligent driving of a wagon by a fellow servant. Now this case,
under the doctrine of stare decisis, would be applied only in future cases
that involved a wagon. This would, of course, be ridiculous, but it makes
the point. The judge has extreme power -manipulation power.
With the limitations imposed on me by time and space, it is impossi-
ble to examine all the functions of the judge. And this would not be too
important here. What is important is that it be recognized that all powers
come from functions. In criminal cases, the judge, imposing a sentence
on a convicted murderer, is exercising a function and at the same time
exerting his power. Illustrative of this is the reported argument between
Judge Parker and the Bishop:
The Bishop asserted that his power was greater because, while the
Judge could merely say, "you be hanged;' the Bishop could say,
"you be damned." The Judge retorted, "yes, but when I say 'you be
hanged, you are hanged."'
As a final illustration of the power of the judge, one might consider
contempt proceedings. Many lawyers at one time or another have heard
the words of a judge: "If you say one more word ... I will hold you in
contempt." Contempt power is held and used by the judge to preserve the
dignity of his office. It is also used to insure a calm and fair trial, free
from outside pressures and influences." This power, however, is not to
be used as a shield to the individual. As the Court stated in Craig v.
Harney:"
(T)he law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges
who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are
supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.
When contempt power is used to preserve the office it is immense.
Speaking of this power, one writer, who was also a trial judge, observed:
In his courtroom he has greater power than the President. A
bystander may with impunity hurl an epithet at the President. Should
anyone so address a judge in the courtroom, he has the power to
fine or imprison him for contempt of court.4'
The power of the judge is pervasive and thus, it cannot be neatly
isolated in a single section of a paper written on The Jvdge. As you will
see in the next sections of this paper, one is forced to appreciate the
power in any discussion of the influence, characteristics and responsi-
33SHIRLEY, LAw WEST OF FORT SMrTH, 139 (1957).
9 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 394 (1947) (J. Jackson dissenting).4 0 1d. at 376- The case involved a contempt action against a newspaper man
who had written critical articles about a judge. In reversing the contempt, the
Court found that the articles were no direct threat to the judiciary. This case will
be discussed in more detail later in the paper.4 1BoTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE, 129 (1952). One might take issue with Judge
Botein when he says that the power of a judge is greater than the power of the
president. Especially is this true in light of what President Andrew Jackson was
reported to have said. In the case, Worcester v. State of Ga., 31 U.S. 515 (6 Pet.
1832), the Court in an opinion written by Marshall held that the Federal govern-
ment had exclusive jurisdiction over Indian lands and that the State of Georgia
had no authority to prosecute a missionary who was living on this Indian land.
The State refused to obey the Court and this refusal was supported by President
Jackson. He declared: "John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce
it." JAmEs, ANDREW JACKSON-PORTRAIT OF A PRESIDENT, 304 (1937).
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bilities of the judge.
III. THE JUDGE'S INFLUENCE
From the start, let me make it clear that, in this section of the paper,
we are not to be concerned with what influences the judge; we are con-
cerned only with the influence of the judge. Judges do represent an in-
fluencing factor in our way of life, our custom, our economy, our gov-
ernmental structure, and even our morals. And the scope of this influ-
ence depends on the boldness of the judge and his acceptance of the
responsibilities and obligations of the office. If we recognize the power
of the judge, we are forced to appreciate his influence. In fact, it is
reasonable to say that power is influence. The power of force, the power
of friendship, the power of fairness will all have influence on the re-
cipient of the power.
Most writers would agree that judges do influence the development
of our society. Their explanation of this might be that judges legislate.
The problem, in attempting to understand these writers, is to determine
how the word "legislate" is being used. John Austin recognized this legis-
lative function. He stated: "I cannot understand how any person who has
considered the subject can suppose that society could possibly have gone
on if judges had not legislated... "' What did he mean by the word
"legislate?" In his discussion of the topic, Austin said that "one cannot
assume that the judge is to enforce morality; otherwise, he could enforce
just whatever he pleases." Other writers have used this word "legislate"
in another sense. According to Professor Bruce: "Law always has been
and always will be judge made rather than legislature made."'" Declaring
that no public official is more influential than the American judge.'
Professor Bruce goes on to paint a glowing picture of the court's position.
Each new invention, each new departure in industry, involves
new rights and obligations and new law. The old law must ever be
adapted to the new situation, and the legislatures never have kept
and never will keep pace with the need.46
Some jurisprudential writers such as Professor Bruce exaggerate the
power of a judge which has the natural tendency of exaggerating the in-
fluence.' While one must guard against over-exaggeration, he must be
42 AUSTIN, THE PROVENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMNED, 191 (Hart ed.
1954). Austin continued by saying "(I)nstead of blaming judges for having
legislated, he (Bentham) should blame them for the timid, narrow, and piecemeal
manner in which they have legislated ...... To understand Austin's views one
must keep in mind that he was basically drawing from English law where there
is an absence of a separation of powers concept which is present under our
Constitution.
43AuSTIN, op. cit. supra note 42 at 32, 191. In his discussion, Austin was
attacking a point of view held by Lord Mansfield who had ruled that a moral
consideration was sufficient consideration for a contract.
U BRucE, THE AMERICAN JUDGE 14 (1924).
45 BRUCE, op. cit. supra note 44 at 1.46 BRUCE, op. cit. supra note 44 at 16.
4 Professor Bruce does not stand alone. He has the company of such men as
Jerome Frank and John Chipman Gray. See: FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND (6th ed. 1949); FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (2nd ed. 1950); KRiSTErN,
A MAN'S REACH: THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF JUDGE JEROME FRANK (1965);
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careful not to under-emphasize this influencing force. The power to
sentence a man to be hanged carries with it a certain influencing force.
One observer of Judge Parker declared that the fate of the 79" served as
an effective warning to the Southwest frontier. "No court has ever
wielded a more salutary influence over a semi-civilized country filled with
the worst of criminals."' This is one way of showing the force of judicial
decisions, but how does a judge influence our economy? This question
was touched upon in the discussion dealing with the identity of the
judge. But the subject will perhaps justify more details.
As observed earlier, John Marshall was said to have achieved his
desired goals through judicial decision 0 He desired a strong central gov-
emnment, a strong national economy, and the respect of the world for
America.s ' How could a judge project this influence? The first step
would be to establish a strong independent judiciary. And this was done.
The Court, in Marbury -v. Madison, ruled that: "It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.""
How could a judge develop a strong central government through judicial
decisions? A sideline question to this is: Why was there a desire for a
strong central government?
Background to the questions posed would, by necessity, deal with
the Jeffersonian-Hamiltonian controversy. If Alexander Hamilton could
be projected to our modem age, he would, no doubt, come as an ultra
conservative. He held a strong belief that the rights of property must
be protected. If a state should grant a corporate charter or an exclusive
franchise, then that state should not be allowed, at a later date or with
a change in the legislature, to take these rights away. Hamilton was not
necessarily a strong supporter of democracy. At least, he did not believe
that the people, through their elected representatives, should be allowed
to regulate or take away property. Thomas Jefferson, oil the other hand,
believed strongly in democracy. He believed that the power of the people,
through their elected representatives, was absolute. He opposed a strong
central government because it was not close enough to the people. In-
dividual rights were best protected by the states. Hamilton supported a
strong central government because he believed that this gave the greatest
protection to property. One can see the irony of this by comparing the
modem day conservative and liberal to these men. Today, this strong
central government established to foster the aims of the conservatives
(Federalist) is being attacked by the modern day conservative. Con-
'
3 This is the number of convicted criminals hanged as a result of the judge's
Power to sentence.49 HARRINGTON, HANGING JUDGE 59 (1951). We are forced to accept the
fact that our criminal laws have a certain deterrent influence; otherwise, we would
become an avenging society. I do not mean for this to be taken as an approval of
capital punishment.
s When reference is made to an iadividual judge, it is not intended that this
detract from my position that this is an erroneous reference. Such, however, is
made necessary for identity purposes -identity of the writer.
"
1JONES, CHIEF JusTcE JoHN MARtSHALL XV (1956) -these wece obser-
vations made by Chief justice Warren.
s2Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1 U.S. 1803).
wid. at 177.
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versely, the modem day liberal does not look to the state to carry out
his aims; he looks to the strong central government.-"
Development of our strong federal system can be demonstrated
through an examination of early court decisions. In 1810, the case of
Fletcher v. Peck' was decided in which the court held a state Act to be
unconstitutional Then in 1818, the Dartmouth College' case was decided.
It was in this case that the court held unconstitutional an Act passed by
the State to amend the charter of a corporation. These decisions had the
effect of centralizing power in the Supreme Court to review state action.
They also provide a platform from which voices were raised in support
of the rights of property. It could even be argued that these cases estab-
lished a firm foundation for the development of our commerce in the
form of free enterprise. But any absolute freedom, if there were ever
such a thing, was short lived. In Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,'
the court held that a franchise (alleged to be exclusive) to build a bridge
was not impaired when a subsequent legislature granted a second fran-
chise. By this decision, the court opened the door to future commercializa-
tion. From this discussion, one can see the influencing force of the judge
in the area of economics and politics."
The influence of a judge is not limited to economics. As stated
before, judicial decisions influence our custom and morals. A good ex-
ample of this force is found in the 1954 segregation case.s In its unani-
mous opinion, the Court was changing a long established custom-
segregation of schools. Can anyone question the influencing force emitted
from this decision? It has been said that with the Brown v. Board of
EducationO case, the Court entered the field of social engineering. It
assumed, through this decision, that morality can be legislated. One can
here accept the influencing force on custom and morals even though it is
S5For further discussion of this subject see: JONES, CHIEF JUsTIcE JOHN
MARSH-ALL (1956) - see particularly the article contributed by Joseph Dorfman,
pp. 124-144.
556 Cranch 87 (10 U.S. 1810).
S6Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat 518 (17 U.S. 1818). In
reviewing this evolution, one should also examine McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat 316 (17 U.S. 1819); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1 (22 U.S. 1827);
and Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519 (U.S. 1839). For a discussion of the
influence that this last decision had on corporate developments see: Warren, II
Harvard Law School 150 (1908).
1711 Pet. 496 (36 U.S. 1837).
" For further consideration of the economic influence of the judge see the
articles cited at notes 10, 11 supra. One might also see Priestley v. Fowler, 3 Mees
& Wells 1 (Exchequer 1837); Murray v. South Carolina Railroad Co., 1 McM.
385 (S. C. 1841); and Farwell v. The Bosto" and Worcester Railroad Corpora-
tion, 4 Metc. 49 (Mass. 1842). All of these cases are discussed in AUERBACIH,
GARRusoN, HuRsT, MERMIN, THE LEGAL PRocESs 15-32 (1961). They con-
cern the development of the fellow-servant rule.
S9Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60 Ibid.
61 Roche & Gordon, Can Morality Be Legislated, NEw YORK TiEs MAGA-
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questionable that the Court was legislating morality.62
Another significant area of influence is legislation. Do judicial de-
cisions affect legislation? The answer is obviously "yes," but then we
must ask: "How?" I do not suggest that there is a judicial decision
behind every statute. What I do suggest is that the influencing force
of the decision can affect certain enactments. It can affect the actual
introduction of a bill, the drafting of a bill, and even the passage of the
bill into law. Statutory laws must not be in opposition to the Constitu-
tion, and whether it is or not in any particular case is a question for the
courts. "This is of the very essence of judicial duty."'
This judicial influencing power goes much further than a constitu-
tional review. The courts on occasion make certain suggestions which
might be followed by the legislature. At other times, the legislature might
disagree with a judicial interpretation and might amend the statute to
make the purpose and intent clearer. In either case, there has been judicial
influence. An illustration of this is found in cases leading to the creation
of the Interstate Commerce Commission." Prior to the creation of this
agency, state legislatures -influenced by the Granger movement - en-
acted railroad regulatory statutes. And under the blessing of the Supreme
Court, these states were allowed to regulate even though it affected in-
terstate commerce." Then in 1886, the Court ruled that if interstate
commerce is to be regulated "it should be done by the Congress of the
United States....66 Shortly thereafter, Congress created the Interstate
Commerce Commission.67 Congress was influenced by a judicial decision.
When the Court created the "rule of reason" as the rule of construc-
tion for the Sherman Antitrust Act, it created, according to some Con-
gressman, uncertainty in the law against trust and monopolies. This rule
was handed down in the case, Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. U. S.,1 in
1911. Congress did not receive the decision with universal approval, but
62Before one could say that the Court, in Brown v. Board of Education, was
legislating, it would be necessary to focus on the effects of the decision. It would
also be necessary to identify the morals involved. You must decide if segregation
was a standard of morality. If you conclude that it was, then you must inquire of
the support for the standard. In such search, one would find that the standard was
supported by state statute- a statute that required segregated schools. It seems
reasonable then to say that the morality was legislated, but it was legislated by the
states. When the Court decided the Brown case, it was in effect saying that the
states could not pass statutes to preserve this particular standard of morality.
Professor Cahn seemed to feel this when he suggested that the Brown case could
have been decided on a purely constitutional law basis. It was not necessary to
resort to sociological and psychological studies as was done by the parties. Cahn,jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157 (1955).
6Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 178 (1 U.S. 1803).
"For more details, see: ScHWARTZ, AMERiCAN ADMINISTRATVE LAw 9-14
(2nd ed. 1962); THoMAs, AN ANSWER TO REGULATION CRITICS 114-117(1964).
4sPeik v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 94 U.S. 164, 178 (1877).
6"Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. v. Ill., 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886).67As a result of this judicial decision, Congress was left with the choice of
regulating or leaving the railroad unregulated. It could not escape the issue by
leaving the problem to the states. And, by the aid of political pressure from the
Grangers, Congress decided to regulate.
"221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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came to recognize the need for laws to supplement the Sherman Act.69 I
don't imply that the "rule of reason" decision was the only influencing
factor, but in any event the Federal Trade Commission Act' and the
Clayton Acte ' were passed by Congress in 1914.
Many other examples of this influencing force of judicial decisions
could be cited; however, the point has been established. And there is
nothing unusual about this; it is the natural workings of our legal system
- the separation of powers and the "checks and balance" concept.
IV. CHARACTERISTICS AND QUAIIFICATIONS OF THE JUDGE
One will immediately recognize that the characteristics and quali-
fications of the judge are controlled by the functions of a judge. As we
saw before, these functions also dictate the scope of the judge's power
and influence. It must be recognized here that characteristics and qualifi-
cations cannot be clearly separated. One fades into and merges with the
other. For example: One might point to the element of fairness as one
of the qualifications of a judge, but how could this be separated from the
term "impartial," which might be classed as a characteristic? There is a
difference between the two terms. Through reference to the characteristics
of a judge we attempt to understand the faceless creature that holds the
office. "Qualifications," the more important of the two, relates to the
fitness of the judge to carry out the functions of his office.
As Professor Calamandrei described the characteristics of the judge:
"A judge is a lawyer mellowed and purified by age....72 He then makes
an interesting comparison of the lawyer and the judge. 3 The lawyer, as-
serted Calamandrei, is the eager, generous youth of judge; the judge is
the mellowed ascetic old age of the lawyer. The lawyer is partisan; the
judge is impartial. The lawyer is dynamic; the judge is static. The lawyer
stands; the judge is seated. The lawyer waves his tentacular arms, ag-
gressive and unrequited; the judge holds his head in his hands, collected
and immobile. And the lawyer must find good arguments; the judge
must only select the better of those presented.74 To conclude his com-
parison of the judge and lawyer, Calamandrei stated:
A judge does not need superior intelligence. It is enough that he
be possessed of an average intellect so that he can understand quod
omnes intellegunt!s
Writers who have ecstasied individual judges, such as Chief Justice
Marshall, Justice Holmes, Justice Brandeis, Justice Frankfurter, Judge
69For early Congressional debates on this subject, see: House debates: 51
CONG. REC. 1866, 8840, 8973; Senate debates: 51 CONG. REC. 11081, 11237(1914).70 38 Star. 717 (1914).
7138 Star. 730 (1914).
72 CALAMANDREI, EULOGY OF JUDGES 17 (2nd ed. 1956, rr. by Adams and
Phillips).73 CALAMANDREI, op. cit. supra at 17-22.74Concerning this last comparison, Calamandrei noted: "But what a moral
responsibility lies in that choice! When a lawyer has accepted a case his road is
clear; he is like the soldier before a target. But the judge needs a force of char-
acter which the lawyer may lack.. ." CALAMANDREI, op. cit. supra note 71 at 18.
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Frank, Judge Learned Hand, Judge Shaw, and many others, have created
a false or erroneous image of the judge. And the sad thing is that lawyers
are guilty of holding this image. We imagine that judges are superhuman
in that they can intelligently decide a case merely because it is presented.
Lawyers, losing sight of their own responsibility of preparing a case, may
vow to avoid that judge in future cases!6
"The lawyer who complains that the judge has misunderstood him,
discredits himself."7 After making this statement, Professor Calamandrei
declared:
It is not the judge's duty to understand, but it is the lawyer's duty
to make himself understood. The judge remains seated awaiting a
communication; the lawyer is on his feet; he should be the aggressor
and approach the judge in both the physical and intellectual sense!,
Under our adversary system it is the opposing lawyers who are charged
with the duty of developing the case. They call their own witnesses and
ask those questions they think necessary to convince the impartial judge.
When Calamandrei suggests that a judge does not need superior intel-
ligence, he is not suggesting that this is not a favorable characteristic.
He means only that there are other characteristics of more importance.
A good example of what I have been discussing can be made through
a comparison of court opinions and lawyer briefs. In 1818, Daniel Web-
ster argued the famous Dartmouth College" case. One writer, after com-
paring Webster's argument with the Court's opinion, observed that Chief
Justice Marshall "followed Mr. Webster's argument very closely.""0 An-
other case argued by Webster was McCulloch v. Maryland"1 in which he
sought to show that a state could not tax the operation of a U. S. bank.
He stated:
If the states may tax the bank, to what extent shall they tax it,
and where will they stop? An unlimited power to tax involves,
necessarily, a power to destroy....,2
In writing the judicial opinion, Chief Justice Marshall used these words:
That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the
power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create
83
To say that Chief Justice Marshall drew heavily upon lawyers for
his opinions is not to speak in a detrimental tone. He was not merely
reducing his own labor through the talents of gifted lawyers; he was
completing a partnership in American destiny.U One of the characteristics
of the judge should not necessarily be originality. His personal intel-
ligence and his own original thoughts should not overshadow careful
76Jerome Frank spoke of the lawyers jockeying for particular judges. FRANK,
LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 112-113 (6th ed. 1949).
7 CALAMANDREI, op. cit. supra note 71 at 22.
- CALAMANDREI, op. ctit. supra note 71 at 22.
"Supra note 56.8 0 lawis, GREAT AmmuICAN LAWYERs Vol. III p. 298.
814 Wheat 316 (17 U.S. 1819).
1id. at 326 (emphasis added).
8
'1d. at 429 (emphasis added). For comments, see: Lewis, op. cit. supra Vol.
III p. 301.
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developments by lawyers lest he ceases to remain impartial
A final note on the characteristics of the judge: "This isn't a job, it's
a new way of life."' The drama of the judge is loneliness. He must be
free from human bonds and cannot seek support or assistance from af-
fectionate friendship. "The drama of the judge is the daily contemplation
of human sorrow and human weakness which fill the world."8 6 Happy
faces do not come into a court of law for the very nature of the proceed-
ing is based on conflict.
Qualifications: From this last paragraph, one can see the merging
of the characteristics with the qualifications; there is no clear line of
division. Qualifications, however, cast on the judge a positive duty which
must, by necessity, be dictated by his functions and responsibilities. The
judge must not be weak. 7 He must not be timid." He must not persist in
error.!' He must not be a tyrant 5 He should not be prejudiced9 He must
not become too influenced by technical rules.92 And above all other
qualifications, he must be independent. In fact most of the above listed
qualifications are needed in order to preserve judicial independence.
Judges, before taking office, take an oath to "defend the Constitu-
tion:"
I, , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
I will support, obey, and defend the Constitution...
This is not intended to be an empty statement for formality purposes.
It charges the judge with certain sacred duties and to carry out his oath,
he must remain independent.
Independence of the judiciary is itself sacred, being gained only
through a difficult struggle between the sovereign and men who recog-
nized the necessity for judicial independence. This struggle, traced back
to the days of Bracton, coincides with the baronial revolt of 1258."4 One
8 JONES, CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL 60 (1956). Article contributed
by Irving Bront.8SBoTEiN, TRIAL JUDGE 4 (1952).
86 CALAyANDREI, op. cit. su'pra note 71 at 72.8
"Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 357 (1946). (Concurring opinion
by J Frankfurter) -'"Weak characters ought not to be judges ...."
isWilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 65 (1949) (concurring opinion by
J. Frankfurter) -"A timid judge, like a biased judge, is intrinsically a lawlessjudge."
t9 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 392 (1947) (dissent-J. Frankfurter) -
"It has not been unknown that judges persist in error to avoid giving the appear-
ance of weakness and vacillation."
95 Paulos v. N. H., 345 U.S. 395, 426 (1953) (dissent-J. Douglas) -
"(H)istory proved that judges too were sometimes tyrants."
91New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting,
J. Brandeis) - "(W) e must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices
into legal principles."92Sparf and Hansen v. U.S., 165 U.S. 51, 174 (1895) (J. Gray dissenting) -
"(I)t is a matter of common observation, that judges and lawyers, even the most
upright, able and learned, are sometimes too much influenced by technical
rules .... "
93 OKLA. CONST. ART. 15 sec. 1. In Oklahoma, the judge also swears to
discharge the duties of his office with fidelity, and swears that he did not pay any
money, etc., to procure the nomination or election.
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of Bractoa's great contributions was his idea that "the King was subject
to God and the law."' Then in 1328 we witness the enactment of the
Statute of Northampton which declared that no royal command shall
disturb the course of the common law, and that if such a command is
issued the judges shall ignore it!' Bracton's philosophy nor the Statute
stopped the attacks; the King continued to exercise prerogatives. But then
came the time of Sir Edward Coke. Born in 1552, Coke became Chief Jus-
tice of England in 1606 during the reign of James I. During his term of
office he put into practice Bracton's famous words -"the King was sub-
ject to God and the law." "Coke's position as the champion of the suprem-
acy of the common law was extremely strong, for it certainly represented
public feeling based upon centuries of medieval thought which had
always looked to the law rather than to the state."9 This supremacy of
the law did become firmly established and when our Constitution was
written, the drafters sought to preserve it through judicial independence.93
According to the Constitution, judges shall, at stated times, receive
for their services, a compensation which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office 9' This language was placed in the Constitution
to preserve the independence of judges. The power of the purse, which
might sway the judge's judgment or action, was removed. Such was the
construction placed on this Constitutional language by the Court in
O'Donoghme v. U. S.'I Citing Alexander Hamilton, the Court said:
Next to permanancy in office, nothing can contribute more to
the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their sup-
port... In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will."'
If we value and wish to preserve our Constitution, we must never
surrender the independence of judges. As Chief Justice Marshall once
said: "I have always thought, from my earliest youth till now, that the
greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and
a sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent judiciary. 10,
For justice' 3 to prevail there must be an impartial trial, and there can be
an impartial trial only if the judge is independent. He cannot be made
dependent through a threat of personal liability for he makes judicial
decisions behind an absolute immunity shield. He cannot be made de-
95 PLUCKNEMT, op. cit. supra at 263.96 PLUcKNHTT, op. cit. supra at 158.9 7 PLUCXNETT, op. cir. supra at 243-244. See also: BRUcE, op. cit. supra
note 44 at 45.
931n articles I, II, and III of the U. S. Constitution the powers of Congress,
the President, and the Courts are set out respectively. And as the Court stated in
Marbury v. Madison, supra note 62 at 177: "It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."
99 U. S. CONST. ART. III sec. 1.
100289 U.S. 516, 531 (1933). This case involved a legislative attempt to
reduce the salary paid to judges of the D.C. courts. It was argued these were not
constitutional courts.
101 Ibid. Court cited Federalist, No. 79.
102 As cited in Id. at 532.
103 Justice meaning equality.
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pendent through the efforts of a calculated press.' But neither is he free
from an unfavorable press. He cannot hold in contempt one who v-niures
to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular."' The sensitive
judge receives no protection to guard him from public oapinion. Such com-
ment and public opinion is necessary to preserve judicial independence.
Comment guards against the individual usurping the powers of his of-
fice."06
If the judge has independence, what other qualifications does he
need? As stated earlier, the judge must not be timid."' "Judges," declared
Justice Douglas, "are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in
a hardy climate." ' 8 While this statement as used here is out of context, it
has some relevance. A judge with fortitude is not likely to be timid. He
will not allow himself to become too influenced by technical rules.10 9 Nor
will he accept blindly prior decisions.1 Instead, the judge will adapt his
decision to meet the growing needs of society.' But in speaking of this,
what are we referring to? Actually, it is only another way of saying that
the judge must be independent. A timid judge is a dependent judge. He
is made dependent by his own fear of change. And a timid judge might
even be made dependent by his fear of adverse comment. To finally
answer the question first posed: An independent judge needs no other
qualifications; he has them.'
To close this section on the qualifications of a judge, it is appropriate
to quote a statement made by the chairman of a committee charged with
the duty of approving the person to fill a vacancy on the bench. Judge
Bernard Botein tells the story."' After he was named by the governor, he
was called before the committee to determine if he had the qualifiactions.
As Botein entered the committee room, he was introduced as the new
judge. The chairman adivsed him that the approval had been unanimous.
Then we read the very pertinent words of the chairman:
"Of course," the chairman went on, "we expect and demand
professional competence, independence, and integrity, and we hope
114See: Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947). In this case a newspaper man
had been held in contempt of court on account of his comments on the way thejudge handled a particular case. While the Court reversed the contempt proceed-
ings, it did say that there had been no direct threat to the judiciary. Justice Frank-
furter and Justice Jackson dissented- the difference being the directness of the
threat.
"I Id. at 376.106 See note 89 supra. Judges on occasion may tend to become tyrants.
107 See note 87 supra.
105 Craig v. Harney, sippra note 103 at 376.
109As Archibald Cox once said: "The tendency to be literal is often enhanced
by lack of familiarity with the subject matter." Cox, Reflecting Upon Labor
Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1488 (1959). See also note 12 supra.
110 See note 88 supra. A timid judge might accept an erroneous decision as
precedent under a blind acceptance of the doctrine of stare decisis.
"I See: Hart, Positivism and The Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARy. L.
REV. 593, 612 (1958).
1 2 Statutes providing for the disqualification of judges serve here as a good
example. 22 OKLA. STAT. sec. 571 (1961). "No judge of any court of record
shall sit in any cause ... in which he may be interested ..... The key is
independence.
"
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for that rare commodity, moral courage. We also expect a judge to
have a decent regard for the rights and feelings of others. Nobody,
not even the losing litigant or his lawyer, should ever leave the
courthouse bruised in personal dignity or spirit, or feeling that his
day in court has been pile-driven into minutes or seconds by an
impatient judge. He goes home at night to a wife, to children, to
parents, friends. He should leave the courthouse with his self-respect
unimpaired." He smiled. "We don't expect miracles, but I'm con-
fident you'll justify our faith.""4
And as the chairman commented, these qualifications are more im-
portant than the type technician you are.
V. RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE JUDGE
With power go responsibilities; and so with the judge. These re-
sponsibilities and obligations have, in the prior sections of this paper,
been indirectly discussed. For this final section, my purpose is to bring
these responsibilities into focus and then to comment on the judge's duty
in connection with judicial opinions. I single out opinions only because
the subject has not been touched upon.
My first attempt will be to bring the judge's responsibilities into
focus. We have seen that the judge is charged with the duty of support-
ing, obeying and defending the Constitution. We have examined the
functions of the judge. And we have reviewed the qualifications of thejudge. In all of these cases we were referring to the office of the judge.
In fact, in the first section of this paper, it was suggested that reference
to the judge had to be to his official capacity. As an individual, thejudge has no power. Conversely, the judge, as an individual, has no
greater responsibility than any ordinary citizen. This is what I mean
when I state that the judge's responsibilities must be brought into focus.
To set an example for our individual standard of morality is not one
of the functions of the judge. An individual who is described as a nasty,
narrow-minded, greedy, cruel, arrogant, insensitive man, a time-serving
politician and a liar, may also be a great judge."' Yet we have a tendency
to demand more from the individual who happens to also be a judge. Just
pick up a newspaper and read the editorials about the shocking fact that
Judge was seen drunk at a party; or that Judge-
was driving while intoxicated. Listen to the comments of members of the
Bar as to the adverse effects that these facts will have on the general
public's faith in our courts. Persons adhering to this type criticism are
guilty of the erroneous position of identifying the functions of the judge
with the individual rather than with the office. They must feel that the
powers of the judge follow the individual, a position that is not only
absurd but also dangerous. It is dangerous in the sense that you elevate
the individual to an unwarranted position.
114 BOTEIN, op. cit. supra at 14.
"' This was a description of Lord Coke by Jerome Frank. KruSTEIN, A MAN's
REAcH: THE PHiLOsOPHY OF JuDGE JEROME FRANK, 48 (1965). Frank then
recognized Coke's greatness as a judge. Can anyone question the greatness of
Lord Coke as a judge? See note 96 sfopra.
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But, some will say, even as an individual, the judge must maintain
a high degree of morality - whatever that word means. If the qualifica-
tion of an individual who may act as judge must be measured by some
standard of morality, there is another question that must be asked. By
what standard shall he be measured? Must he be a family man-a Protes-
tant-a Democrat-and a non-drinker? Must he be a segregationist?
These could all be classed as standards of morality, but do any of them
add anything of value to the qualifications of the judge? To answer this
question, I would need much more knowledge and understanding of
jurisprudence than I now possess. I would also have to be a psychologist
and a sociologist which I am not.
All I can do is to raise the questions and suggest the possible con-
sequences. First, take the family man. If we say that our judges must be
devout family men, what is the possible sacrifice? Do we possibly sacrifice
his independence? Can he impartially decide a case where one of the liti-
gants is a devout family man and the other is a drifter? If we require a
judge, as an individual, to hold himself as a non-drinker, do we sacrifice
his independence as a judge? Will he impartially decide a driving-while-
intoxicated case? And what about the judge who must, by public demand,
be a segregationist? Does he impartially decide cases dealing with the
rights of Negroes? When asked in this fashion, the answer to these ques-
tions seems clear. To impose our standard of morality on the judge, we
do sacrifice his independence. We must remember that every person,
whether or not they agree with our standard, has a deep-rooted right to an
impartial trial.
Good morals as bad morals can make the judge dependent- if his
decisions are controlled by such. Law and morality must be separated."6
This separation is weakened when we place too much importance on the
daily private life of the judge, as an individual Especially is this true if
the judge holds his office through the election process. Litigants do not
come before a court to be tried under the electorates standard of morali-
ty; they come before the court to be tried in accordance with the law.
If one is to be tried in accordance with the law, the next question is:
What law? Courts, under the doctrine of stare decisis, will to some extent
be bound by prior judicial decisions. This, then, raises the question of
legal opinions. The judge, when writing an opinion, has a responsibility of
writing a clear and understandable opinion. After Professor Bruce had
pedestaled the judge's position, he examined the obligations attached to
that position. As to the written opinion, he stated:
The well considered written opinion is absolutely necessary to a
democratic government of laws as opposed to an autocratic govern-
ment of men. It is the greatest safeguard against judicial tyranny.17
1161 don't propose to discuss this deep jurisprudential question. The separation
of law and morality or the separation of the "is" and the "ought" is a position
taken by the school of analytical jurisprudence. Hans Kelsen of this school indi-
cated that a pure theory of law is a theory of positive law. Kelsen, The Pure
Theory of Law & Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L REv. 44 (1941). See
also: KELsEx, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945). For a more
sophisticated view on the subject see: Hart, The Concept of Law 181-207 (1961).
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While writing an opinion, the judge must remain conscious of its
purpose. This purpose is to explain the basis of the judicial decision; it
is not intended to be a literary masterpiece. On this point Professor
Calamandrei observed:
In the hope of seeing their "brilliant" opinions published in the
law reports or having them create favorable impressions when pro-
motion is being considered, there is a danger that some judges will
treat the decision as the point of departure for a brilliant essay rather
than a bridge of passage to the just conclusion -the true function of
the judicial process.1
To make the point even stronger, Professor Calamendrei states that:
"The judge who is intent only upon presenting casual readers with the
delight of a literary masterpiece, instead of offering a just solution to the
sufferings of the parties, fails to comprehend the holy function of justice.", 9
Of course, literary skill, if it promotes clarity, is a blessing in a judge."'i
But to say of a judge that his decisions are fine in a literary sense is not a
compliment to him as a judge.'21 In order to have an opinion identified
by logic and clarity, the case must be adequately prepared. Lawyers then
must be charged with a certain amount of responsibility in connection
with opinions. This does not mean, however, that the judge can delegate
his function or responsibility to the lawyer. It is the judge who is the
impartial person; and it is the judge who must prepare the findings upon
which his decision is based.'1
To command respect, the judge must make his position clear. By clear-
ly defining his position, the judge avoids the appearance of weakness and
vacillation. If there is nothing absolute or sacred about the doctrine of
stare decisis, then it is ridiculous for a court to distinguish conflicting cases
through the use of fiction.' " If a judge is wrong in his decision, then let
him be clearly wrong. By so making his position clear- whether right or
wrong-he will gain the respect of his brethren and the general public.
118CALAmANDREI, op. cit. supra note 71 at 61-62.
119 CALAMANDREI, op. cit. supra note 71 at 62.
I" KRISTEIN, A MAN'S REACH: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JUDGE JEROME FRANK
45 (1965).
121 CALAMANDREI, op. cit. supra note 71 at 58.
a2For a critical comment toward a judge who allowed the winning attorney
to prepare findings, the conclusion and the judgement of a case, see: U.S. vi. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 .n. (1964). This was a very significant
antitrust case; yet the trial court decided not to write an opinion. While this was
not too bad, the court went further and directed counsel to prepare findings upon
which the decision would be based. A long footnote was devoted to explain the
responsibility of trial judges and it would bear your attention. I can't say that
this affected the Sup. Cts. decision; however, an unusual thing was done. The
Court, after reversing the trial court (on substantive grounds) refused to remand
the case. It directly ordered the divestiture of the merged companies. Id. at 662.
See also the comments of Justice Harlan in his dissent. Id. at 662-663.
21BRUCE, op. cit. supra note 116 at 68-74.
Vol. 2, No. 2
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 2 [1965], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol2/iss2/1
